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Abstract
Cognitive feedback in group decision making is
information that provides decision makers with
a better understanding of their own decision pro
cesses and that of the other group members. It
appears to be an effective aid in group decision
making. Although it has been suggested as a po-
tential feature of group decision support systems
(GDSS), little research has examined its use and
impact. This article investigates the effect of com-
puter generated cognitive feedback in computer-
supported group decision processes. It views
group decision making as a combination of in-
dividual and collective activity. The article tests
whether cognitive feedback can enhance control
over the individual and collective decision mak-
ing processes and can facilitate the process of
convergence among group members. In a
laboratory experiment with groups of three deci-
sion makers. 15 groups received online cognitive
feedback and 15 groups did not. Users receiv-
ing cognitive feedback maintained a higher level
of control over the decision-making process as
their decision strategies converged. This re-
search indicates that (1) developers should in-
clude cognitive feedback as an integral part of
the GDSS at every level, and (2) they should
design the human-computer interaction so there
is an intuitive and effective transition across the
components of feedback at all levels. Research-
ers should extend the concepts explored here to
other models of conflict that deal with ill-
structured decisions, as well as study the impact
of cognitive feedback over time. Finally, research-
ers trying to enhance the capabilities of GDSS
should continue examining how to take advan-
tage of the differences between individual,
interpersonal, and collective decision making.
Keywords: Group decision making, group deci-
sion support systems, group pro-
cesses, cognitive feedback
ACM Categories: H.O, H.4
Introduction
Feedback to users about their decision processes
has received relatively little attention in the group
decision support systems (GDSS) literature. In-
terestingly, findings from studies at the level of
individual support systems (Kleinmuntz, 1985;
Te'eni, 1991; 1992) indicate that computerized
systems offer opportunities for providing feed-
back effectively—opportunities that rely on in-
stant retrieval and computation that are im-
practical under manual conditions. This is impor-
tant because feedback in individual decision
making has been shown to increase decision
quality and confidence (Hogarth, 1987). DeSanc-
tis and Gallupe (1987) have suggested that feed-
back about decision processes might also be
provided in GDSS environments, particularly in
cognitive conflict tasks—tasks that involve the
resolution of conflicting viewpoints as opposed
to conflicting motives. This study takes some first
steps in conceptualizing and testing the impact
of feedback on GDSS.
Studying feedback in a group context, as op-
posed to an individual, requires consideration of
additional levels of analysis and decision-making
activity. Group decision making incorporates not
only individual activity but also interpersonal and
collective aspects of behavior:
1. At the individual level, group members pro-
cess information individually, concentrating
only on their own decision-making processes.
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2. At the interpersonal level, they begin to learn
about the opinions of other members and take
them into account in their own decision-
making processes to make an individual
decision.
3. At the collective level, the group exchanges
and processes information as a collective ac-
tivity in order to make a group decision.
Figure 1 depicts these levels as concentric circles
to denote that the higher levels encapsulate the
lower levels of activity.
Nadler (1979) suggests that feedback can be pro-
vided regarding all three levels of group decision
making. Information technology makes this per-
spective particularly plausible. Group members
can work individually at workstations to analyze
problems, receive information about the decision-
making processes of other group members
through a computer network, and then engage
in an electronic meeting, using the information
generated individually whenever necessary.
Some collaborative tools, such as Colab (Stefik,
et al., 1987) and Groupware (Ellis, et al,, 1991),
are designed to support such a scenario. This
article takes this approach one step further. By
modeling the decision-making process with quan-
titative techniques and using computers to in-
stantly generate feedback about the process,
decision makers can use the feedback to affect
the outcome of the very same process.
Past research on using computers to provide
feedback about decision making has concen-
trated on feedback about the outcome of the
decision-making process (Tindale, 1989). In con-
trast, this study concentrates on feedback about
the decision-making process itself. Feedback
about the decision-making process is provided
interactively as an integral part of the individual
and group processes (loosely, this is what we
mean by cognitive feedback).
The objective in this paper is to conceptualize
and empirically test the effects of feedback on
cognitive aspects of decision-making behavior.
The paper looks at the effects of cognitive feed-
back on phenomena that exist at each level of
the decision making activity: individual, interper-
sonal, and collective. The next section develops
the conceptual link between feedback and the
three levels of decision-making activity. The
subsequent sections describe an experiment and
the experimental results, followed by a discus-
sion of the results and their implications for prac-
tice and future research.
Cognitive Feedback and
Cognitive Conflict
Two theoretical frameworks will be employed in




Figure 1. Levels of Anaiysis (n the Context of a GDSS
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individual, interpersonal, and collective levels.
Social judgment theory (Hammond, et al., 1980)
is suitable for understanding how individuals take
into account the decisions of others but is not rich
enough to describe the dynamics of collective de-
cision making. In contrast, social decision
schemes theory (Davis, 1973) is concerned with
the interaction between group members that
leads to a collective decision. Both are quan-
titative frameworks that can serve as platforms
for developing hypotheses and empirical testing.
In order to clarify the ensuing discussion, con-
sider a group-based procedure for personnel
screening. A group of decision makers meets to
screen candidates from a pool of applicants for
an entry-level position (such sessions are fre-
quently conducted by large corporations prior to
personal interviews). Before the meeting, each
member rates the applicants on the basis of three
cues: work experience, test scores, and educa-
tion. Each decision maker works individually on
a computer system that presents the three cues
for each applicant and records the decision
maker's rating. At the meeting, the group collec-
tively reviews the ratings given by each group
member and agrees on a collective rating for
each applicant.
This discussion assumes that individuals for-
mulate a decision strategy before executing it
(Payne, 1982). The individual's decision strategy
describes a sequence of subtasks and the nec-
essary control over their execution. An example
of a decision strategy would be to compute a
weighted average of the three cues using equal
weights, and then take the integer of the result
as the rating. Individual group members may
have different decision strategies with different
weighting schemes.
We can now define cognitive feedback more con-
cisely as information about the decision maker's
decision strategy and the extent to which the
strategy is applied accurately. In contrast to out-
come feedback, which describes the accuracy of
a decision, cognitive feedback provides decision
makers with insight into their decision processes
(Balzer, et al., 1989). Cognitive feedback is ef-
fective in enhancing the quality of the decision
process by clarifying the decision maker's inten-
tions and controlling their implementation (Doher-
ty and Balzer, 1988). In the personnel screening
example, cognitive feedback can take several
forms. Cognitive feedback at the individual level
may be information about relative weights as-
signed to cues by a decision maker in rating a
group of applicants, the functional relations be-
tween cues and the decision criterion, and the
integration rules for combining information. Cog-
nitive feedback at the interpersonal level may be
a measure of agreement among group members
on their individual ratings. Cognitive feedback at
the group level may be the consistency with
which the group has been making collective deci-
sions. The next two subsections relate cognitive
feedback, in turn, to the individual and interper-
sonal ievels (using social judgment theory) and
to the collective level (using social decision
schemes theory).
Cognitive feedback at the
individuai and interpersonal levels
Group decisions are often characterized by
cognitive conflicts, i.e., conflicts among group
members that exist despite similar interests. In
other words, the existence of interest differentials
(or strategic motives) among players is not a nec-
essary condition for conflict to exist. Cognitive
conflicts arise when group members differ in their
understanding of the problem (even when their
respective interests converge) and are due to
cognitive limitations (Brehmer, 1976; Hammond,
1965). In the personnel screening task, group
members may use different strategies in rating
candidates and, hence, disagree, but they may
fail to realize exactly how their strategies differ.
Cognitive conflicts appear regularly in group deci-
sion making, constituting a more persistent prob-
lem than is generally realized (Baike, et al., 1973;
Carroll, et al., 1988).
On the whole, cognitive conflicts should be
minimized (Hammond, 1965). A better under-
standing of other views is important for individual
performance (Piaget, 1954) as well as group per-
formance (Hirokawa and Pace, 1983). An under-
standing of other views may reveal shortcomings
in an individual's own strategy or disagreement
between members over values or assumptions.
(This is not to say that conflict in general disrupts
effective decision making. Indeed, several tech-
niques for injecting conflict into group processes
have been advocated. However, these tech-
niques are predicated on the assumption that the
group members are aware of the conflicting views
and understand them.) Moreover, a lower level
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of cognitive conflict will usually make it easier to
attain consensus when consensus is feasible
(Castore and Murnighan, 1978; Svenson, 1989).
According to social judgment theory (Hammond,
et al., 1980), two constructs determine the level
of cognitive conflict experienced by a group. At
the level of individual analysis, cognitive control
is the extent to which the decision maker con-
trols the execution of his or her decision strategy.
At the level of interpersonal analysis, strategy
convergence is the degree of similarity between
the decision strategies of the group members. It
captures differences in how each group member
integrates cues in forming an overall rating, e.g.,
one member may weigh work experience more
heavily than education, whereas another member
may do the reverse. Cognitive conflict is the result
of incomplete cognitive control, a lack of strategy
convergence, or both. We will review past work
that links cognitive control and strategy con-
vergence to cognitive conflict and then argue that
cognitive feedback enhances cognitive control
and strategy convergence and, thereby, reduces
cognitive conflict. The upper right corner of
Figure 2 shows the relationships among the
elements of social judgment theory.
Both cognitive control and strategy convergence
are affected by cognitive limitations. Decision
makers lack insight into their decision strategies
(Hoffman, 1960; Hogarth, 1987) and are inconsis-
tent in executing their intended decision strate-
gies because of a limited capacity to control
execution (Bowman, 1963; Dawes and Corrigan,
1974). Even more so, individuals lack insight in-
to the strategies of others. Thus, two individuals
engaged in formulating a joint decision are unlike-
ly to know the extent to which their respective
strategies differ (BaIke, et al., 1973). In the
absence of interest differentials, strategy con-
vergence will depend primarily on understand-
ing the strategies of other group members.
Research on cognitive conflict has uncovered two
related phenomena: (1) the level of cognitive con-
flict in collective decision making is initially high
and gradually declines, and (2) the structure of
the conflict changes over time. Initially, cognitive
conflict emerges from a disagreement over deci-
sion strategy. Over time, the strategy differences
tend to decrease, but in the process, decision
makers tend to lose cognitive control. Brehmer
(1972) attributes this behavior to cognitive limita-
tions. In order to apply the newly acquired
strategies consistently, decision makers increas-
ingly have to use new cues in place of the cues
they had used initially, but they apparently fail
to do so in a systematic manner. Instead, they
decrease their dependency on the original cues
without a corresponding increase in the use of
new cues. In doing so, decision makers lose their
cognitive control and cannot apply their knowl-
edge of decision strategies in a consistent man-
ner. As a result, the reduction in cognitive conflict
due to converging strategies is counter-affected
by lower cognitive control. These findings have
been replicated over a variety of task conditions,
individual differences, and payoff conditions
(Brehmer, 1976).
Regarding the effects of cognitive feedback (see
Figure 2), research on individual decision mak-
ing has shown that cognitive feedback can
increase cognitive control (Hammond and Sum-
mers, 1972) and facilitate the learning of new
decision strategies (Hogarth, 1987; Jacoby, et al.,
1984). We hypothesize that these effects carry
over to the group context. In order to attain
cognitive control, decision makers need to know
their own decision strategy, to know that they are
diverging from the strategy, and to know how they
are diverging. Cognitive feedback provides this
information and is therefore expected to enhance
cognitive control and, moreover, maintain cog-
nitive control uniformly over time. That is, in con-
trast to an expected decrease in cognitive control
as strategies converge, we hypothesize that deci-
sion makers that are provided with cognitive feed-
back will maintain control while converging in
their strategies. Recall that in the absence of a
decision aid. decision makers lose cognitive con-
trol as they execute new strategies but regain
control with the repeated use of the same
strategy. These arguments are formulated as
hypotheses in the context of an experimental
design that has two conditions (with and without
cognitive feedback), which are measured over
time.
H1a: Cognitive feedback will increase
cognitive controi.
H1b: Cognitive feedback wiii result in a
uniformiy iiigh ievel of cognitive control
over time.
To attain strategy convergence, the decision
maker needs to know the other members' deci-
sion strategies and to be aware of the strategy
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Figure 2. impact of Cognitive Feedback at Different Leveis of Anaiysis
differences among members. Apparently, given
enough time, group members will learn about
each other's viewpoint even if structured infor-
mation is not provided (Brehmer, 1976). However,
Jacoby, et al. (1984) stress the need for cognitive
feedback that can explain deviations in decisions
in order tc efficiently learn the appropriate deci-
sion strategy for new situations. Brehmer (1979)
also suggests that cognitive feedback, such as
information abcut the relative weights for cues
and the integration rules for combining informa-
tion, is typically needed to learn new decision
strategies. Furthermore, such information is
needed to compare the new decision strategy
with other decision strategies.
iH2a: Cognit ive feedback wiii increase
strategy convergence.
H2b: Strategy convergence wiii increase over
time regardiess of whether cognitive
feedback is provided.
Most of the studies mentioned above have been
conducted with a regression formulation of social
judgment theory (cf. Balzer, et al., 1989; Ham-
mond, etal., 1980). This formulation provides in-
dices of decision-making activity at the individual
level (cognitive control) and the interpersonal
level (strategy convergence). It is particularly ef-
fective in modeling the information integration
phase of decision making, which is prevalent in
the personnel screening example (Einhorn, et at.,
1979; Goldberg, 1970). An extended version of
this framework is used in this study (see
Appendix).
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In summary, it is hypothesized that cognitive
feedback will increase cognitive control and
strategy convergence of decision makers. It is
also hypothesized that cognitive feedback will
change their behavior over time. Furthermore, as
long as strategies do not diverge, we should ex-
pect higher cognitive control to be reflected in
lower cognitive conflict. The next section iden-
tifies an aspect of the collective level of decision
making that may also be affected by cognitive
feedback.
Cognitive feedback at the
collective level
Recall the example of personnel screening. After
the interpersonal activity, the group meets face
to face to reach a collective rating for each job
applicant. In contrast to the interpersonal activi-
ty, the group is viewed as a level of analysis with
its own laws of functioning (Von Cranach, et al.,
1986). Although these laws include social and
task-related aspects of the collective activity
(De Keyser, 1983), we concentrate only on task-
related laws that bear on the cognitive aspects
of group decision making. Unlike the interper-
sonal activity, strategy at the collective phase
must include group decision rules for combining
individual opinions into a collective decision.
Of the several theories that build on the Idea of
group decision rules, social decision schemes
theory is the most reievant to this discussion (see
Stasser, et al., 1989, for a review of the theory
and its recent extensions). This theory assumes
that (1) groups adopt group decision rules to yield
group outcomes; (2) the same groups will use dif-
ferent rules in different situations; and (3) different
groups may use different rules in the same situa-
tions. For example, for tasks in which members
will recognize a correct answer when it is pro-
posed, a good description is a continuous debate
until truth "wins" unanimously. For judgment
tasks, such as the personnel screening task in
which there is no recognizable correct answer,
a voting scheme may be more appropriate
(Laughlin and Adamapoulos, 1982). Social deci-
sion schemes do not necessarily change indi-
vidual decision strategies. Indeed, some group
decision rules can produce group/individual dif-
ferences without members changing but merely
acquiescing (Davis, 1973).
The group members' personal consequences of
having participated in collective decision may
result in post-decisional conflict, i.e., a situation
in which a person has committed to a decision
that to him or her seems incorrect (Janis and
fvlann, 1977). This happens when there is public
conformity without private acceptance, and it can
be distinguished from the situation of public con-
formity with private acceptance by removing
the group influence and eliciting individual
behavior to see whether the compliant behavior
disappears (Festinger, 1953).
A group decision rule specifies how to combine
the members' decision outcomes into a group
outcome (e.g., an average of the individual
ratings of applicants) or how to combine mem-
bers' decision strategies into a group decision
strategy that will be applied to the specific cases
(e.g., a majority rule on the appropriate weights
to use in evaluating applicants). Like individual
decision-making activity, collective activity also
requires control to ensure the correct execution
of group decision rules (Johnson and Davis,
1972;Savoyant, 1984). Indeed, effective groups
usually exercise some form of control (Edinger
and Patterson, 1983; Hirokawa and Pace, 1983).
Groups, like individuals, suffer from cognitive
limitations in exercising collective control (Chalos
and Pickard, 1985; Steiner, 1972). For example,
there are cognitive limitations on the task-related
communication between the group members dur-
ing the collective activity. In general, group
members will be unaware of differences in deci-
sion strategies. Janis (1972) and Allison and
Messick (1987) suggest that this occurs because
groups tend to overestimate their unanimity.
Stasser, et al. (1989) note that group discussions
are usually dominated by information that is
shared and supportive of existing preferences,
barring the discussion of unshared information
that may reveal distinct decision strategies.
Cognitive feedback that describes the members'
decision strategies and the differences between
them should, therefore, reduce such process
losses. The lower right corner of Figure 2 shows
this relationship.
The objective here is to posit the impact of
cognitive feedback on collective control. To do
so, two dimensions to characterize collective con-
trol are introduced; level and degree. The level
of collective control refers to whether the group
decision rules determine how to combine in-
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dividuals' decision outcomes (denoted as a lower
level) or individuals' decision strategies (denoted
as a higher level). The degree of collective con-
trol is the extent that a group decision rule ex-
ists and is executed. For higher levels of
collective control, a high degree of collective con-
trol includes control over the execution of the
combined decision strategy, which is analogous
to cognitive control at the interpersonal level.
Because cognitive feedback includes information
about decision strategies, we hypothesize that
cognitive feedback will increase the level of col-
lective cognitive control by focusing the group's
decision-making activity on decision strategies as
opposed to decision outcomes (Te'eni, 1991;
Vallacher and Wegner, 1987). This should result
in the formulation of group decision rules on how
to combine decision strategies and how to con-
trol the execution of the combined strategy.
Following the rationale of Hypothesis la, cogni-
tive feedback should also increase the degree of
collective control.
H3a: Cognitive feedback will increase the
ievel of collective control.
H3b: Cognitive feedback wiii increase the
degree of coifectlve control.
Social decision schemes theory cannot predict
post-decisional conflict. It, does however suggest
that in situations of cognitive conflict, as opposed
to interest differentials, a higher level of mutual
understanding will lead to personal change rather
than acquiescence, fn other words, rather than
comply with the collective decision but retain their
personal decision strategies, group members will
change their personal decision strategies (Davis,
1973). We should therefore expect that a higher
level of collective controi. if exercised, will result
in a lower levei of post-decisionai conflict, as
shown in the iower right corner of Figure 2.
In summary, social decision schemes theory sug-
gests a phenomenon (coiiective control) at the
collective level of analysis that may be affected
by cognitive feedback. We introduced two dimen-
sions of coiiective controi (levei and degree) and
hypothesized that cognitive feedback wouid in-
crease control along both dimensions. The next
section discusses the methodoiogy used to test
the three hypotheses presented above.
Method
This section describes an experiment based on
the personnel screening task used to illustrate
concepts in eariier sections. Piiot tests with eight
groups (four In each condition) were conducted
in order to test the software and ensure that sub-
jects could foiiow the instructions. The ex-
perimental procedures and software interfaces
were revised as a result of the piiot studies. The
finai form of the experiment is described below.
Experimental design
Ninety graduate and undergraduate subjects (66
maies and 24 femaies) participated in the experi-
ment. The subjects were students majoring in in-
formation systems, and they received course
credit for the experiment. Subject to students'
time constraints, they were randomly assigned
to 30 groups of three members. The groups were
randomiy divided into two conditions: 15 groups
that were provided with cognitive feedback and
15 groups that were not. Other than the avaiiabiii-
ty of feedback data (described iater m detail), the
human-computer interaction in both conditions
was identical.
The experiment had three stages: training, ex-
perimentai tasks, and post-experimental
debriefing.
The purpose of the training session was to en-
sure that each group member used a different
set of weights for aggregating the cues, thereby
creating cognitive conflict within groups as a
starting condition of the experiment (cf. Brehmer,
1980). Subjects were asked to learn, through a
series of examples, the decision strategy foliowed
by a hypothetical team of experts. The system
provided each subject with a series of three-cue
descriptions of appiicants, one at a time, and
asked the subject to rate each appiicant. (in our
example, the three cues were work experience,
test scores, and education.) The system then pro-
vided the "actuai" rating, i.e., the rating given
to that applicant by the hypothetical "commit-
tee." This process was repeated for 60 triais.
Committee scores given to different members of
a group were made up of different sets of
weights. For exampie, the committee scores for
Member 1 of a group used weights of 0.8, 0.1,
and 0.1 for the three cues, whereas scores for
fvlember 3 used weights of 0.1, 0.1, and 0.8,
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respectively. Subjects performed the task in-
dividuaiiy, and no time limit was stipulated. The
predictability of the task was high {H^ = 0.90).
The training took between 10 and 20 minutes.
The effectiveness of the training can be evaiuated
in two ways. We can ascertain the match be-
tween a subject's decision strategy and that of
the committee (Brehmer and iHagafors, 1986).
Our training produced a high matching value
(0.95) and is consistent with past findings on high-
predictability tasks (Brehmer and iHagafors, 1986;
Hammond and Summers. 1972). The effective-
ness of training can also be measured through
the ievei of cognitive confiict in the group at the
end of the training task. Our training produced
a high levef of cognitive conflict (0.61), consis-
tent with vaiues obtained in past studies (cf.
Brehmer. 1976). Before starting on the ex-
perimental tasks, subjects in the feedback con-
dition were also trained on how to interpret and
use the cognitive feedback.
The experimental tasks inciuded repeated in-
stances of the personnel screening task. This
stage was organized in four blocks, each block
containing 10 cases, i.e., 10 applicants to be
rated. The use of blocks enables an analysis of
behavior over time. There is no agreement on the
optimai number of blocks and triais within biocks
(see Adeiman. 1981; Hoffman, 1960; Schmitt,
et ai., 1976). The pilot study used five blocks (of
10 triais each), but the sessions proved to be too
iong for the subjects, and the number ot biocks
was reduced to four.
At the debriefing stage, subjects were asked to
provide information on decision strategies and
the use of feedback. Subjects described through
self-reports whether they adopted explicit de-
cision strategies in the individuai and coiiective
phases of the experiment, and if they did. what
those strategies were. Cognitive feedback sub-
jects aiso provided descriptions of how they used
the feedback provided to them. Additionaiiy, each
subject was given 10 cases (i.e., appiicants) and
was asked to rate these cases (these ratings were
taken to ascertain the post-decisional confiict).
The three stages of the experiment followed one
after the other, in continuous sessions that iasted
from 50 to 90 minutes in total. The sessions were
conducted in a closed room in the presence of
at ieast one experimenter.
Experimental task
Subjects were asked to screen appiicants whose
profiles were given as three integer evaiuations
of work experience, test scores, and education.
Tasks with a simiiar structure have been used ex-
tensively in research on individual and group
decision making (e.g., Tindale, 1989; Zigurs,
et ai., 1988) as weii as in research on personnei
seiection (e.g., Dougherty, et ai., 1986; Lane, et
ai., 1983). Additionaiiy, personnei screening tasks
with a simiiar structure are frequentiy used by
large corporations and are performed in group
settings.
Subjects worked with personal computers (iBM-
compatibie) that were linked through a iocal area
network. Three computers were arranged in a
20 X 15 room so subjects couid see oniy their own
screens. Tabie 1 describes the experimentai
tasks. At the beginning of each biock. each group
member worked on a separate machine to rate
10 applicants. The system presented each ap-
plicant's profiie through three cues (each on a
1-9 scale), and the subject keyed in an overaii
rating of that applicant (aiso on a 1-9 scaie). The
choice of the number of cues and the structure
of the scaies is in conformance with previous
studies (e.g., Dougherty, et ai,, 1986).
Once a subject had compieted the rating process
for an applicant, the subject was provided access
to information concerning the ratings provided by
other group members (and cognitive feedback for
subjects in the cognitive feedback condition).
While no face-to-face communication took piace
at this stage, subjects had the opportunity to con-
sider new information and adapt their own be-
havior by changing ratings. The subjects could
revise their own decisions as often as they wished
in view of updated information concerning the be-
havior of others (and cognitive feedback where
applicabie).
After aii members compieted their individual
ratings, group members joined together at a
singie machine to formulate a coiiective rating for
each applicant. There were no restrictions on
communication while subjects arrived at their coi-
iective rating. Each group had a scribe who keyed
in the ratings once the group as a whoie agreed
on a vaiue. The scribe was chosen at random.
An analysis of the resuits showed no differences
in performance between the scribe and other
members.
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Tabie 1. Sequence of Events Within Each Blocit of the Experimentai Tasks
At the start of each block, each individuai is given 10 cases. The individuai does the
foiiowing;
Rating
individuai (1) Each subject rates aii 10 cases.
Subjects receive additionai information concerning the ratings provided by other
group members (and cognitive feedback if in cognitive feedback condition).
Subject revises ratings as desired.
Subject is free to iterate between steps (1) and (3) untii he or she indicates that




After aii members of a group have finaiized their ratings, the group works together
to arrive at a group rating for the same 10 cases.
Coiiective (1) Group makes estimates on ail 10 cases.
Rating (2) Groups in cognitive feedback condition receive feedback.
(3) Group revises ratings as desired.
(4) Group iterates between steps (1) and (3) untii the group members indicate that
the ratings are finai.
Human-computer interaction
For subjects who did not receive cognitive feed-
back, the computer screen used to complete the
task appeared as in Figure 3. While subjects
worked individualiy, the human-computer
interaction was as follows:
Subject S begins the interaction with a set of
online instructions. After pressing any key, S
sees 10 cases (i.e.. applicants) in the bottom left
window of the screen. S formuiates a judgment
on each case, rating each applicant with a value
on a 1-9 scale. S can move up or down using
the arrow keys and change ratings by typing over
previous vaiues. The bottom row always contains
instructions on what is to be done next. When
satisfied with the 10 ratings, S presses the END
key. The screen is then refreshed with updated
information (whatever information in the remain-
ing windows of Figure 3 is avaiiable at that time).
S then evaiuates the information, and has the
opportunity to revise any ratings. This process
can be repeated untii S presses the HOME key.
which signifies that S has finaiized his or her
decisions.
in order to minimize iearning probiems. the in-
terface for the support systems was the same in
both phases. The foiiowing describes how group
Member 1 performs the task, beginning with the
interpersonal phase. Concentrate on the four win-
dows on the bottom ieft side of Figure 3. in the
left-most window, the numbers 6 ,1 , and 4 on the
first iine are an appiicant's evaiuations on work
experience, test score, and education. Member
1 studies these evaluations and gives this appii-
cant an overaii rating of "3 . " which is shown in
the second window. When information is avail-
abie from Member 2, it is dispiayed in the third
window at Member 1's request (simiiariy. Mem-
ber 3's ratings are dispiayed in the fourth win-
dow). Member 1 continues to rate the appiicants
and revise the ratings untii he or she is satisfied
with the ratings. When aii the group members
finish their individuai work, they begin the collec-
tive rating. At that time, the group observes the
information in the first four windows and inputs
its ratings in the fifth window (entitied "Group
Estimate").
For subjects in the cognitive feedback condition,
the screen used to complete the task appeared
as in Figure 4. In comparison with Figure 3,
severai forms of cognitive feedback have been
added in the three windows in the upper part of
the screen. The cognitive feedback, along with
the rest of the screen, was updated upon request.
Cognitive feedback was defined eariier as struc-
tured information about the decision strategy and
its execution, it consisted of information on deci-
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Enter a number between I and 9, then press END. Press HOME if the estimates are final
Figure 3. Screen for No Feedback Subjects
sion strategies, cognitive controi, and strategy
convergence, which were computed according
to the formula of the regression formuiation
described in the Appendix. To the extent possi-
bie, we used graphicai displays that have been
found to be effective for approximate com-
parisons of quantitative information (Brehmer,
1984).
The relative weights given to cues are siiown as
horizontai stacked bars (Figure 4, top center win-
dow). The system caiculated cue weights as
follows. Beta weights were caicuiated from a
muitiple regression of cue vaiues and the sub-
ject's estimates. Each weight was then trans-
formed to represent percentages of the sum of
squared weights (cf. Hoffman, et a!., 1981). For
exampie, the first beta vaiue was transformed as
foiiows:
Thus, beta vaiues of 0.4.0.8, and 0.2 were shown
as 0.19, 0.76. and 0.05. respectively. Trans-
formed weights on the three cues were then
displayed by the system as a horizontai stacked
bar.
Cognitive control is presented through individuai
consistency scores and an index of cognitive con-
troi, i.e., the cognitive controi exercised by the deci-
sion maker, The individuai consistency scores are
the ratings that wouid be given by decision makers
if they were entireiy consistent in weighting the
cues. The scores are dispiayed in the second col-
umns of the four windows on the bottom of Figure
4. For example. Member 1 rated the first and sec-
ond appiicants with "3 , " and the respective con-
sistency scores were " 3 " and "6." The horizontai
bars, iabeied as consistency in the top right
window, dispiay, for each member, the index of
his/her cognitive controi.'
The verticai bars (Figure 4. top ieft window)
depict, for eacii of tiie three possibie pairs, an
index of strategy convergence, iabeied as the
' Computations of the index of cognitive control are shown in
the Appendix. The indices of matching and consistency are
calculated on a conlinuum of 0-1. A score of 0 means com-
pletely inconsistent (or no match at all, as the case may bB),
and a score of 1 means complete consistency Of matching
Subjects usually start off ai the lower end. The idea of the
feedback is lo move them to as high a level as possible.
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Enter a number between 1 and 9, then press END. Press HOME if the estimates are final
Note; Weight for wo?-k experience
Weight for educatioti
Weight for test scores
Figure 4. Screen for Cognitive Feedback Subjects
match between two members. The index of strat-
egy convergence represents the extent to which
the decision strategies of two decision makers
are similar {the computation of the index of
strategy convergence is shown in the Appendix).
Dependent measures
Table 2 summarizes the dependent measures
used in the study. In order to test Hypothesis 1.
we calculated an index of cognitive control in
each block for each subject. For Hypothesis 2,
an index of strategy convergence was computed
for each group in each block. Strategy con-
vergence is the average of strategy convergence
indices between the possible pair combinations
of members. Additionally, we computed the in-
dex of cognitive conflict to test the social judg-
ment theory predictions related to it, as shown
in Figure 2. The above measures were derived
from estimates made in the final iteration within
each block.
For process and manipulation checks, three
variables were used to capture subjects' decision
behavior and their use of cognitive feedback: the
number of iterations made by each individual dur-
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ing each block, the average time taken for each
iteration, and attention to feedback. The number
of iterations indicates the extent to which a sub-
ject formulated and revised his or her own deci-
sion strategy. The average time for an iteration
is a surrogate measure for the cognitive effort re-
quired in that iteration. Since the interpretation
and use of feedback requires cognitive re-
sources, we expect cognitive feedback subjects
to iterate more often and spend more time per
iteration than those not receiving cognitive feed-
back. Attention to feedback was assessed
through a short questionnaire given during the
debriefing stage. The questionnaire showed each
element of feedback and asked the participant
to identify it on a multiple choice format. They
were then asked if they used the feedback in
making their decisions, and in what manner.
For Hypothesis 3, the group decision rule was
determined from the experimenter's notes and
cross-checked with self-reports by group mem-
bers. The self-reports on the formulation and use
of group decision rules were matched with the
experimenter's notes in the following manner.
Subjects' responses were compared with the ex-
perimenter's notes and aggregated into an agree-
ment matrix. The proportion of agreement and
the Kappa coefficient were then compared. The
raw proportion of agreement was 0.86. The Kap-
pa coefficient, which measures the proportion of
agreement obtained after separating the agree-
ment attributable to chance {cf. Cohen, 1960) was
0.79, with a less than 0.01 probability that the true
Kappa coefficient was outside the range 0.765
and 0.843. Information on group decision rules






















Index of cognitive control
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Computer log on number of iterations in
each block and its association with
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Group decision rules: experimenter's
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an explicit decision strategy, and (b) at which
point of time (i.e, block) in the experiment they
did so.
The data on group decision rules were then com-
bined to create a social decision schemes matrix
(Tindaie. 1989). A social decision schemes matrix
enables us to analyze processes through which
group members combine their individual deci-
sions to form a group decision. For ascertaining
a group's level of control, we counted the number
of instances where group members decided on
cue weights first and ratings later and the number
of times when group members decided on ratings
without explicitly considering cue weights. A
group's degree of controi was evaluated by deter-
mining when, if at all, a group decision rule was
explicitly formed and followed. Additionally, post-
decisional conflict was measured in each group
by computing the distance (the inverse of the
multiple correlation) between the group decision
strategy and that of each member as derived
from the ratings given during the post-
experimental debriefing stage.
For the process and manipulation checks
associated with the collective level of analysis,
we evaluated the extent to which groups used
cognitive feedback. The group's use of cognitive
feedback was determined from the experi-
menter's notes on specific references made by
group members about feedback, and cross-
checked with self-reports of group members. For
example, if a group member directed the group's
attention to consistency scores, the group was
considered to have used feedback in that block.
We ascertained whether groups used cognitive
feedback and the blocks in which they used such
feedback.
Results
Cognitive feedback at the
individual and interpersonal levels
Figure 5 depicts the cognitive control of in-
dividuals at the end of training and during the in-
terpersonal phase. As Table 3a shows, subjects
in the cognitive feedback condition exhibited
higher cognitive control than subjects in the no
feedback condition, across all blocks. Table 3b
summarizes the MANOVA, which shows that the
overall cognitive controi of subjects was
significantly higher in the feedback condition
(p < 0.001). Hypothesis la is thus supported.
Furthermore, the possibility that individual
cognitive controi was a function of membership
in a particular group is ruled out.
Figure 5 also indicates that individuals in the
cognitive feedback condition reached a high de-
gree of cognitive control at the end of the first
block (mean = 0.92, block 1) and maintained it
over the remaining blocks (mean = 0,92, block
4). Subjects in the no feedback condition, on the
other hand, appeared to have lost cognitive con-
trol in the second block and then recovered it
gradually. The trend analysis in Tabie 3c indi-
cates a quadratic trend. Table 3b shows a signifi-
cant btock'feedback interaction (p < 0.01),
thereby suggesting that the quadratic trend is
primarily present in the no feedback condition.
Thus, the analysis confirms that while cognitive
control in the cognitive feedback condition was
uniformly high, control in the no-feedback con-
dition decreased initially and then increased
gradually. Hypothesis 1b is thus supported.
Figure 6 and Table 4a, which show the means
of strategy convergence, indicate that cognitive
feedback groups had higher strategy conver-
gence than the no feedback groups. However,
as the MANOVA in Table 4b indicates, the dif-
ference was not significant. Thus, Hypothesis 2a
is not supported by the data. Hypothesis 2b
predicts that strategy convergence increases
over time. The MANOVA in Table 4b shows a
significant within-subjects effect (p < 0.001),
confirming our prediction.
Figure 2 posits an association between cognitive
conflict and cognitive control, and between cog-
nitive conflict and strategy convergence, respec-
tively. The analysis shows a high negative
correlation between cognitive control and
cognitive conflict ( -0 .41 , p < 0.001), thereby
confirming that high cognitive control is associ-
ated with low cognitive conflict. The correlation
between strategy convergence and cognitive
conflict is also negative {-0.39, p < 0.01), in-
dicating that high strategy convergence is
associated with low cognitive conflict, as shown
in Figure 2.
Overall, the process and manipulation checks in-
dicate that individuals used the cognitive feed-
back. Computer logs show that subjects in the
cognitive feedback condition iterated through
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Figure 5. Cognitive Controi of individuals
their decisions more often than others. They
made, on the average, 3.5 iterations per block
in their decision processes, in comparison with
an average of 1.9 iterations for subjects not
receiving cognitive feedback {F[1,88] = 37.49,
p < 0.001). Within the cognitive feedback con-
dition, a comparison of the iteration patterns of
the five best subjects in terms of cognitive con-
trol scores with the five worst subjects reveals
that subjects with the best scores iterated, on
average, significantly more often than those with
the worst scores (p < 0.05). The corresponding
difference in the no feedback condition is not
significant. Thus, cognitive feedback is associ-
ated with more iterations, and more iterations are
associated with higher cognitive control.
The logs also show that subjects receiving
cognitive feedback spent more time adapting
their decisions, an average of 176 seconds for
each iteration, compared with an average of 136
seconds in the no feedback condition
(F[1,88I = 21.19, p < 0.001). A test of com-
parison {like the one stated above) shows a
significant difference {p < 0.05) between the
best and worst subjects in the cognitive feedback
condition, but none in the no feedback condition.
Thus, there is a clear association between time
per iteration and cognitive control when cognitive
feedback is provided.
Self-reports indicate that the subjects attended
to and used the feedback. In answering the ques-
tionnaire on the use of feedback, most subjects
(40 out of 45) indicated that they used the feed-
back provided. Their responses indicate that
such feedback was used in formulating and revis-
ing decision strategies and ensuring cognitive
control. In summary, the iteration measures and
self-reports indicate that the feedback provided
was used by subjects to enhance their decision
making.
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Tabie 3. Effect of Cognitive Feedback on Subjects' Cognitive Control


























3b. iMuitivarjate Analysis of Variance for






































3c. Analysis of Variance for Tests on Trends for
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Figure 6. Interpersonal Strategy Convergence
Cognitive feedback at the
coiiective ievel
Hypothesis 3 predicts the effect of feedback on
group decision rules. A log-linear analysis of the
data shows that the proportion of groups that first
considered decision strategies (and then derived
ratings after agreeing on cue weights) was sig-
nificantly higher in the cognitive feedback con-
dition (G-Square = 27.31; p < 0.04). In sharp
contrast, the proportion of groups that considered
ratings without any explicit formulation of deci-
sion strategies was significantly higher in the no
feedback condition (G-Square = 31.27;
p < 0.01). Thus, Hypothesis 3a is supported by
the evidence.
Tables 5a and 5b provide information on the
degree of group control. Table 5a shows whether
groups formulated an explicit decision strategy
to guide their decisions. Significantly more
groups in the feedback condition formulated
a decision strategy (Chi-Square(i) = 3.59,
p < 0.059). As Table 5b indicates, feedback
groups also managed to arrive at a strategy much
earlier in the decision process (Chi-Square(2)
= 5.664, p < 0.059). Hypothesis 3b is support-
ed. Moreover, as Table 6 indicates, groups in the
feedback condition actually used feedback, con-
firming that the experimental manipulation was
successful.
Furthermore, there was a strong negative correla-
tion between the level of collective control and
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Table 4. Effect of Cognitive Feedback on Strategy Convergence
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post-decisional conflict ( - 0.45) and between the
degree of collective control and post-decisional
conflict ( - 0.40). These results are consistent with
the relationship predicated in Figure 2 between
collective control and post-decisional conflict.
Discussion and Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to study the im-
pact of computer-based cognitive feedback on
the individual, interpersonal, and collective leveis
of decision-making activity. Building on social
judgment theory (Hammond, et al., 1980), it ex-
plains how cognitive feedback enhances an in-
dividual's cognitive control and facilitates strategy
convergence between group members. Both
types of impact reduce cognitive conflict. Using
the social decision schemes theory (Davis, 1973),
the paper also examines how cognitive feedback
enhances a group's control over group decision
rules. These relationships were then tested in a
laboratory experiment.
Summary of findings
Groups of three worked on a personnel screen-
ing task. Group members rated the applicants in-
dividually and then reached a unified group
rating. The results of the experiment show that
the impact of cognitive feedback on cognitive
control was statistically significant. Furthermore,
cognitive feedback was hypothesized to maintain
a high level of cognitive control over time, despite
the adoption of new decision strategies in the pro-
cess of strategy convergence. This was also con-
firmed. The impact of cognitive feedback on
strategy convergence, although positive, was not
statistically significant. The predicted negative as-
sociations between cognitive control and cogni-
tive conflict and between strategy convergence
and cognitive conflict were supported.
At the collective level, it was hypothesized that
cognitive feedback would increase the degree
and level of collective control. As predicted,
groups that received cognitive feedback for-
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mulated group decision rules more frequently
than groups that did not, and this difference was
statistically significant. Moreover, the decision
rules that cognitive feedback groups formulated
specified the creation of collective decision
strategies, as opposed to the combination of deci-
sion outcomes (ratings), which was more typical
of the groups that did not receive cognitive feed-
back. Furthermore, the predicted negative asso-
ciation between collective control and
post-decisional conflict was supported.
Limitations of the results
The generatizability of the results is constrained
primarily by the nature of the task and subjects.
The personnel screening task was relatively
structured; the relevant information was pre-
Tabie 5. Effect of Cognitive Feedback on Coiiective Controi











Note: This table indicates the number of groups that formulated a decision strategy in the course of
the experiment. Thus, 12 groups in the cognitive feedback condition formulated a decision strategy.
Chi-Square = 3.59; d.f. = 1; p = 0.058.
5b. Time of inttiai Formuiation of Decision Ruie
Biocic 1 Biocii 2 Block 3 Biocit 4
Cognitive Feedback
No Cognitive Feedback
Note: This table indicates the block in which a group first formulated its decision strategy. Thus, nine
groups in the cognitive feedback condition formulated their initial decision strategy in block 1,
Chi-Square = 5.664; d.f. = 2; p = 0.059.



















Note: This table indicates the number of groups that used cognitive feedback in a particular block. Thus,
14 groups used cognitive feedback during Block 1.
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sented in the same format and the same strategy
could be applied to new cases. Many such tasks
exist and are supported by computerized sys-
tems, e.g., student screening, loan evaluation,
investment portfolio, and technical ratings of ven-
dor proposals for government contracts. Pro-
viding timely information on the process of
decision making shouid be helpful in unstruc-
tured tasks as well. This may be difficult to in-
vestigate empirically, but on the basis of our
preliminary findings, it may prove to be a fruitful
challenge.
The second limitation was the sample population.
The subjects were students with no personal
stakes in the outcome of their deliberations. The
analysis of the post-experimental debriefing,
together with the experimenters' observations,
indicated that the subjects were interested in the
experiment and devoted the time and effort need-
ed for serious deliberations. Nevertheless,
replication with "real" and experienced stake
holders is clearly needed.
impiications for the design
of systems
How can these findings be translated to practical
use? Figure 1 depicts three leveis of information
processing found in many situations of group
decision making. We believe that our discussion
points to two guidelines for the design and im-
plementation of GDSS: (1) include cognitive feed-
back as an integral part of the GDSS at every
level; and (2) design the human-computer interac-
tion so there is an intuitive and effective transi-
tion across the components of feedback at all
levels. To date, there is no formal methodology
for developing GDSSs, but we believe that these
guidelines should be part of any future
methodology.
This approach has been used successfully in the
development of SPIDER, a computer-based
system for supporting business planning that is
distributed across organizational functions
(Boland, et al., forthcoming). At the individual
level, the user engages in a private, self-refiective
planning process that concentrates on an
analysis based on the viewpoint of one particular
organizational function. At the interpersonal level,
users engage in dialogue to incorporate view-
points of other functions into their own thinking
processes. It wouid have been a mistake to
assume that the interpersonal level can be sup-
ported by simply adding a mailing facility to the
individual level system. A dedicated task analysis
at the interpersonal level suggested a set of
techniques that help assimilate new viewpoints
into the old ones, techniques that had no place
at the individual level. One such technique is a
comparison between old and new cognitive
maps. Conversely, typical GDSSs cannot be ex-
pected to support work at the individual level by
simply adapting GDSS facilities to individual
decision support.
It is not enough, however, to support each level
of information processing separately by providing
appropriate modes of human-computer interac-
tion. The different modes must be designed con-
currently to facilitate an easy and effective
transition between interaction modes. One can-
not build these modes in isolation and then hope
for a smooth integration. Having satisfied the in-
formation requirements for each level, it is impor-
tant to strive for consistency across levels without
sacrificing functionality. Such consistency, both
in terms of the format and the content of infor-
mation, facilitates an easier transition between
levels. This approach to system design is com-
monplace whenever the same user is expected
to work in several interaction modes (Shneider-
man, 1992). This study has shown that this ap-
proach is especially important in the transition
between the individual, interpersonal, and collec-
tive levels because of the loss of cognitive control
that the transition causes.
This study has shown that feedback about the
decision-making process is an effective tech-
nique for helping the user regain control during
the transition between levels. It is expected that
less structured tasks will require even more feed-
back to balance the loss of control (Te'eni, 1992).
Designers should look for additional techniques
to facilitate an easier transition, such as tech-
niques for translating the new information from
other collaborators Into familiar structures. A
relatively easy example is an automatic transla-
tion of formats, say, from tables to graphs. This
would make it possible to convert the incoming
messages (at the interpersonal level) into the
same format used by the receiver at the individual
level. More complex translations of the content
of incoming messages that make the message
more comparable to the receiver's existing
knowledge may also be helpful in facilitating an
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easier transition. Advances in data modeling are
making such translations increasingly feasible.
Directions for future research
This study demonstrates that computer-
generated feedback is an effective decision aid
for dealing with cognitive conflict tasks. This con-
clusion is in line with DeSanctis and Gallupe's
(1987) anaiysis of the possible roles of GDSS in
a model of group tasks based on McGrath (1984).
The model classifies group tasks according to the
group's purpose in decision-retated meetings:
generating ideas, choosing alternatives, and
negotiating solutions. In relating our study to
McGrath's model, cognitive conflict tasks con-
stitute a sub-class of negotiation tasks. It is im-
portant to limit our conclusions to the negotiating
aspect of group decision making. Indeed, to the
extent that control inhibits creativity, providing
cognitive feedback too early in the phase of
generating ideas may actually be counter-
productive (Hogarth, 1982). Moreover, because
this study adopted a linear model view of deci-
sion making, the conciusions should be limited
to tasks where a similar perspective is ap-
propriate. Future research should attempt to ex-
tend these concepts to other models of conflict
that deal with ill-structured decisions (Hogarth,
1987; Janis and Mann, 1977).
This study also suggests the need to carefully ex-
amine the impact of cognitive feedback over time.
As Figure 5 indicates, subjects not receiving
cognitive feedback gradually recovered their
cognitive control over time (albeit to a level lower
than those that received cognitive feedback).
Also, a few groups stopped using cognitive feed-
back after the first block (Table 6). This is perhaps
indicative of over-confidence, a bias commonly
observed in situations involving repetitive deci-
sions (Hogarth, 1987). Thus, the results highlight
a design dilemma of whether to try to correct
users' biases by directing their attention to feed-
back over time. Future research should focus on
the effect of time in determining the relative
usefulness of different forms of feedback.
From a methodological perspective, this study
demonstrates the utility of a multi-level framework
for studying the use of GDSS (Figure 2). It facili-
tates the investigation of behavior at multiple
leveis, thereby bringing us closer to a realistic
understanding of the behavior of GDSS users.
In addition, this study has made an attempt at
studying the process of computer-aided decision
making. Future studies may benefit by adopting
a more intensive method of process tracing, such
as think aloud protocols, especially for more com-
plex models of decision making where it is dif-
ficult to infer decision strategies from outcomes.
Protocol analyses may also reveal how and why
the use of feedback changes over time.
More research is also needed to understand how
the technology should be designed so as to
capitalize on the advantages of both interper-
sonal decision making and collective decision
making (Te'eni, 1992). In particular, future
research should examine the unresolved ques-
tions of the timing and format of feedback. Im-
mediate feedback, while more effective than
delayed feedback, also imposes greater cognitive
load on decision makers (Jacoby, et al.. 1984).
Thus, the trade-offs between effort and accuracy
entailed in presenting immediate versus delayed
feedback need to be understood. Additionally,
because the format of presentation of informa-
tion affects decision behavior (Payne, 1982),
future research should investigate the differen-
tial effectiveness of multiple formats of presen-
tation of feedback. Guidelines are also needed
on general GDSS design issues, such as the fre-
quency of information refreshes, the exchange
of interpersonal information (cf. Ellis, et al., 1991),
and the manner in which cognitive feedback
mechanisms should be incorporated within the
overaii architecture of GDSS- We hope these
questions will trigger future research.
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Appendix
Social Judgment Theory—A Regression Formulation
This appendix provides a regression formulation of group decision making based on social judgment
theory.^ We begin with a two-system view of the theory and extend it to capture interpersonal decision
making in tasks where there are no optimal solutions.
A Two-System View
Figure Al presents a regression formulation of the social judgment theory (Dudycha and Naylor, 1966).
The formulation has three components: the task structure, the decision maker, and the environment.
The task structure is constituted by a set of cues (Xp X2..... X^). In the personnel selection task described
earlier, the cues constituting the task are: work experience, test scores, and education. The decision
maker's decision, V^, is defined in the right hand side of the model. The consistency score for each
decision indicates the score that would be given by a decision maker if the person had been entireiy
consistent with his or her decision strategy. Consistency scores are calculated by computing beta weights
from a multiple regression of cue values and the decision maker's estimates, and then multiplying the
beta weights with the cue values. Thus, we get:
and
Yg = Yg + Zg. where
Yg denotes the consistency score for a decision Yg, and Zg is the residual.
The cognitive control exercised by a decision maker is measured by the index of cognitive control (Rg),
and is operationalized as the multiple correlation between the cues and judgments (Hursch, et al., 1964).
From the propositions of multiple regression theory (Tucker. 1964), we get:
variance (Yg) = Rg^ and
variance (Zg) = 1 - Rg^.
Analogously, the left hand side of the model in Figure Al denotes the environment (represented by the
actual event, Vg). The extent to which the actual event is similar to the model of the environment is
known as task predictability (Rg), similarly operationalized as the multiple correlation between the cues
and actual events. The predictability of a task depends on the nature of the task. Some tasks (such
as credit risk of a loan applicant) are more predictable than others (such as stock prices).
The relationship between the decision maker and the task is captured through two measures: accuracy
and knowledge. A decision maker's performance in a task is summarized through the accuracy index
(r^), which indicates the correspondence between the subject's response and the environmental event.
Tucker (1964) has shown that:
r- = Covariance lYaYc) = Covariance (Y^YJi + Covariance
formuiations descritwd here are derived from Hammond and Summers (1972), i-iufsch, et ai. (1964). and Tucker (1964).
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Figure A l . Lens Model: A Two-System View
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Now, if the correlation of (YgYg) is denoted by G, and the correlation of (Z^Zg) is denoted by C, then
the above can be written as:
fg = GRgRg + C[(1- fl/) (1 - Rg^)] (1)
G is known as the knowledge index and represents the similarity of the decision maker's use of cues
with the environmental relationships. The knowledge index is interpreted as the extent to which a model
of the decision maker's strategy is similar to that of the model of the environment. C is the correlation
between the variance in the task system and the subject's judgmental system that is unaccounted for
by G. When the systematic variance in the criterion can be accounted for by a linear function of the
cue values, then the contribution of the second term on the right-hand side of Equation 1 is negligible
(Hammond and Summers, 1972). Thus, Equation 1 can now be written as:
where:
r^ , or accuracy, is the correlation between the judgment and the actual event;
G, or knowledge, is the correlation between the linearly predictable variance in the judgment and
the event;
Rg, or cognitive controt, is the multiple correlation between the cues and judgments; and
RQ, or task predictability, is the multiple correlation between the cues and actual events.
An Extension of the Two-System View to Capture Interpersonal
Interaction
The two-system view can be modified to capture interaction between multiple decision makers in group
settings (Brehmer, 1979). We use the extended view to operationalize cognitive conflict and strategy
convergence. To do this, we substitute the environment on the left hand side with another decision maker
(illustrated in Figure A2). With this substitution. Equation 2 can be written as:
where
7^. or cognitive conflict, is(1 - the correlation between the judgments made by persons? and those
made by person S2).
G, or strategy convergence, is the correlation between the linearly predictable variance in S1's judg-
ment and S2's judgment.
and RQ2 (cognitive control of the respective decision makers) are the multiple correlations
between the cues and judgments made by S1 and S2, respectively.
The index of strategy convergence is interpreted as the extent to which the decision strategies of two
decision makers are similar. Equation 3 can be extended to represent situations of three or more deci-
sion makers (Cvetkovich, 1973).
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Figure A2. Lens Model: A Modified View
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